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With the history of political speech at sporting events and the United 
States becoming a part of a multinational coalition to host the 2026 
World Cup that will bring a large wave of international tourists to the 
country, it is important to discuss the application of constitutionally 
protected speech to non-citizens. While much has been written on 
American citizens’ right to freedom of speech, the discussion around the 
speech of foreign nationals in the U.S. is very limited. We address this 
need for discussion by using an incident which took place at the Rio 
2016 Olympics as a hypothetical model to provide an examination of the 
rights of non-citizens inside American sporting venues. We provide a 
history of the connection between sport stadium speech and the First 
Amendment in the United States and revisit some of the most influential 
legal battles impacting future First Amendment claims by non-U.S. 
citizens before providing an analysis of how our hypothetical plaintiff 
may fare in court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Tarlan Chahardovali is a doctoral candidate at Florida State University. 
 † Neal Ternes is a visiting instructor in the Department of Kinesiology at 
Miami University. 
 ^ John Holden is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Management in 
the Spears School of Business at Oklahoma State University. 
284 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.2
  
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 285 
II. SPORT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT .................................................... 287 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS FOR NON-U.S. CITIZENS ........................ 295 
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 303 
2019] Non-Citizens, The First Amendment, and Stadium Speech 285
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 2016 Rio Olympics, Iranian activist Darya Safai was asked 
by Olympic security staff to leave a preliminary volleyball match 
between Iran and Egypt for holding a protest banner that read “Let 
Iranian women enter their stadiums.”1  Safai burst into tears but 
continued to hold the sign.2 Security staff eventually allowed her to stay, 
in spite of the International Olympic Committee policy which prohibits 
“demonstration or political, religious[,] or racial propaganda” in Olympic 
sites or venues.3  Safai said she cried because “it hurts to explain again 
and again that this peaceful action is not a political message, but a 
positive message of peace and human rights.”4  
  
 1. Iran Olympic protest: Woman asked to take down sign, BBC NEWS (2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37075735. Safai, the founder of the “Let 
Iranian Women enter their Stadiums” campaign, initiated the movement following a 
decision by the Iranian leadership to ban women from attending stadiums, which were 
hosting sporting events between teams composed of only men. See Daisy Wyatt, Darya 
Safai: A strong woman can change history – Iranian media are scared to show that, 
INEWS (Aug. 24, 2016), https://inews.co.uk/news/world/iranian-woman-human-rights-
darya-safai/. While Safai is often seen as the public face of the movement she often 
travels with a group of supporters and has also seen others organically support the 
movement at other high-profile events including the Euro 2016 soccer tournament. Id. 
 2. Wyatt, supra note 1. 
 3. Int’l Olympic Comm. [IOC], Olympic Charter, art. 50, ¶ 2 (Aug. 2, 2015), 
available at https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf. The ban on 
political speech within the Olympic charter is likely a paper tiger of an idealized Olympic 
movement, which has not existed for many decades. The Olympics have been used as 
political propaganda in and of themselves since at least 1936. See generally SUSAN D. 
BACHRACH, THE NAZI OLYMPICS: BERLIN 1936 82–84 (2000); see also AMY BASS, NOT 
THE TRIUMPH BUT THE STRUGGLE: THE 1968 OLYMPICS AND THE MAKING OF THE BLACK 
ATHLETE 6 (2002); see also Anne-Marie Brady, The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of 
Mass Distraction, 197 CHINA Q. 1, 1 (2009). In 2014, International Olympic Committee 
President Thomas Bach stated “that no athlete would be denied ‘freedom of speech’ . . . 
[while] in Sochi” for articulating their displeasure with the Russian government’s laws 
attacking the freedoms of homosexuals. Ben Rumsby, Winter Olympics 2014: IOC 
president Thomas Bach says competitors will not be gagged at Sochi Games, TELEGRAPH 
(Jan. 27, 2014, 7:28 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/winter-
olympics/10600110/Winter-Olympics-2014-IOC-president-Thomas-Bach-says-
competitors-will-not-be-gagged-at-Sochi-Games.html. 
 4. Iran Olympic protest: Woman asked to take down sign, supra note 1. 
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With the announcement on June 13, 2018 that North America 
(Canada, the United States, and Mexico) would jointly host the 2026 
World Cup, and with the majority of the games being played across the 
United States, examples like Safai’s are likely to test U.S. law.5 The 
World Cup and international events of its scale have often come with 
strings attached, including the requirements that hosting countries change 
laws, at least temporarily, for the “benefit” of the event.6 While the 
Constitution remains beyond reproach, even from the diamond-encrusted 
claws of an organization like FIFA, the upcoming event is likely to raise 
concerns amongst visitors to the U.S. regarding their rights while in the 
country. 
Though much has been written on speech concerns of American 
citizens, comparatively little discussion exists about the speech of foreign 
nationals in U.S. sporting venues.7 Given the present political climate of 
protest and the number of policy initiatives targeting foreign nationals, 
we believe a discussion of the First Amendment and its applicability in 
cases involving foreign nationals at American sporting events is 
overdue.8 Using Darya Safai’s protest as a model, we discuss the relevant 
  
 5. See Kevin Baxter, 2026 World Cup is awarded to North America, L.A. TIMES 
(June 13, 2018, 2:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-2026-world-cup-
20180613-story.html. 
 6. Kathleen Tang, The World Cup: Changing Country’s Laws, One Tournament 
at a Time, BERKELEY J. INT’L L. BLOG (Oct. 26, 2013), http://berkeleytravaux.com/world-
cup-changing-countrys-laws-one-tournament-time/. 
 7. For an overview of the literature on stadiums as public forums, see Ryan M. 
Rodenberg, John T. Holden & Asa D. Brown, Real-Time Sports Data and the First 
Amendment, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 63, 72–73 (2015); see also Christopher J. 
Kaufman, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: 15-Yard Penalty and Loss of Free Speech in Public 
University Sports Stadiums, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1235 (2009); see also Howard M. 
Wasserman, If You Build It, They Will Speak: Public Stadiums, Public Forums, and Free 
Speech, 14 NINE: A J. BASEBALL HIST. & CULTURE 15 (2006)[hereinafter If You Build It, 
They Will Speak]; see also Gerhardt A. Gosnell II, Banner Policies at Government-
Owned Athletic Stadiums: The First Amendment Pitfalls, 55 OHIO ST. L. J. 1143 (1994). 
 8. The context within which we frame our First Amendment analysis is 
following the announcement on January 27, 2017 by President Donald Trump that 
visitors from Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, and Iran would be banned 
(except in limited circumstances) from entering the United States for ninety days. 
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order 
No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, 8,978 (Jan. 27, 2017) (citing 8 U.S.C.1187 (a)(12)).The 
executive order also cancelled previously issued visas leaving many on arriving flights 
 
2019] Non-Citizens, The First Amendment, and Stadium Speech 287
  
constitutional and statutory law and remedies which may restrict her 
protest if it were conducted in an American sporting venue.  Part II of 
this article reviews the First Amendment and applicable cases concerning 
fan protests involving signs in U.S. stadiums to determine whether 
attempts to limit Safai’s speech, like the ones she experienced at the 
2016 Rio Olympics, could potentially result in litigation.  Part III 
analyzes the status of foreign nationals under the Constitution, and raises 
a number of concerns as to how non-citizenship status may impact 
potential litigation stemming from speech restrictions at sport stadiums.    
II. SPORT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The scope of free speech protection for non-citizens in sporting 
contexts is largely an issue of first impression in the United States. Sport-
related First Amendment complaints have historically primarily 
concerned the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the 
Constitution.9 However, several academic legal analyses examining First 
Amendment actions are available to provide insight on our hypothetical 
plaintiff.   
For example, during the San Diego Chargers’ final preseason game in 
1989, a fan-created banner that read “Fire Ortmayer”10 was removed 
  
scared they would be trapped in airports, arrested, and/or subject to deportation. Trump’s 
Executive Order: Who Does Travel Ban Affect? BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38781302. Almost immediately challenges 
in the forms of protests and injunctions were formed or filed. Id. Interestingly, while the 
legal challenges to the travel ban did not raise the First Amendment issue, an order by the 
Supreme Court of the United States instructed the parties to brief the issue of whether the 
most recent iteration of the travel ban violates the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.  Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court’s Travel Ban Dilemma, ATLANTIC (Jan. 
28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/travel-ban-supreme-
court/551669/. 
 9. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). Both 
clauses refer to the government’s ability to interfere with or endorse particular religious 
beliefs. J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 
327 (1969); John C. Jr. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, The Political History of the 
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 279 (2001). 
 10. “Steve Ortmayer [was] the Chargers’ director of football operations” from 
1988 to 1989, whom many of the fans blamed for making trades that hurt the team and 
also for the team’s overall poor performance. Michael Granberry, ACLU Hoists Free-
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from the lower level of San Diego’s Jack Murphy Stadium.11 Though no 
lawsuit was filed, the regulation of banners within the publicly-owned 
Jack Murphy Stadium drew considerable dissent from advocacy groups.12 
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) launched an 
investigation which concluded that, “[w]hether fans are right or not in 
their opinion of Ortmayer . . . they have a right to express such views in a 
publicly owned stadium, either verbally or through the use of banners.”13  
According to an ACLU spokesperson, the broad censorship of signs in 
order to limit public criticism to the Chargers’ leadership constituted a 
violation of Constitutional principles.14 
In another 1989 incident, New York Yankees fans protested owner 
George Steinbrenner with banners reading “George Must Go,” “Fire 
George,” and “George, YOU Are the Problem,” which were confiscated 
by Yankees stadium security.15 Norman Siegel, executive director of the 
New York Chapter of the ACLU said: “[s]elective confiscation of 
banners based upon the content of the message cannot be tolerated in a 
free society.”16  Additional legal analysis concluded that “no compelling 
interest justifies banner prohibitions, whether viewpoint-based or 
viewpoint-neutral.”17   
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Yankees 
began playing “God Bless America” during the seventh-inning stretch 
and using chains and guards to keep fans in their seats so they would 
  
Speech Banner in Stadium Sign Ban, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 17, 1989), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-17/local/me-248_1_free-speech. 
 11. Id.  
 12. See e.g., id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. An ACLU representative is quoted as saying that a prohibition on banners 
“would seem antithetical to what sports in America are all about.  As long as they don’t 
interfere with a fan’s ability to enjoy the game, I don’t see why anyone would mind. To 
not be able to express yourself at a game with a banner or with your own mouth, well, it’s 
nothing less than un-American.” Id. 
 15. David Margolick, Peanuts and Censors at Yankee Stadium?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 9, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/09/nyregion/peanuts-and-
censors-at-yankee-stadium.html.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Lawrence A. Israeloff, The Sports Fan v. The Sports Team Owner: Does a 
Franchise’s Prohibition of Spectators’ Banners Violate the First Amendment?, 
24 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 419, 423 (1991). 
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stand and participate in a show of patriotism.18  When one fan in 2008 
attempted to leave his seat and use the restroom, he was thrown out of 
the stadium by New York City police officers.19  The New York Civil 
Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on behalf of the fan claiming a violation 
of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The case was ultimately 
settled out of court.20  However, legal commentary on the issue noted that 
attempts to compel patriotism in this matter fosters potential violations of 
the First Amendment by both restricting the free speech of individual 
fans as well as establishing and enforcing a state religion.21  
Another discussion of First Amendment rights of fans at Yankees’ 
games has emerged over the implementation of a policy banning the use 
of vuvuzelas in the stands.22  Vuvuzelas—plastic horn instruments 
popularized in the United States following the 2012 World Cup in South 
Africa—came under scrutiny after a Yankees fan using the instrument to 
heckle the visiting Philadelphia Phillies was asked to leave a game in 
2010.23  While no lawsuit was filed on behalf of the fan, legal scholarship 
investigating the issue has contended that the use of a vuvuzela 
constitutes protected expressive speech and that the fan would likely be 
able to successfully sue the Yankees for prohibiting him from playing the 
instrument during a game.24 
First Amendment issues affecting fans are not relegated to actions 
taken outside of stadiums.  For example, in soliciting bids for the Super 
Bowl, the NFL has routinely requested governmental protections for 
  
 18. Nick DeSiato, Silencing the Crowd: Regulating Free Speech in Professional 
Sports Facilities 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 411, 411 (2010). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Kevin Underhill, Yankees Fans Now Free to Move About During “God Bless 
America’”, LOWERING THE B. (July 7, 2009), https://loweringthebar.net/2009/07/yankees-
fans-now-free-to-move-about-during-god-bless-america.html. 
 21. See generally DeSiato, supra note 18, at 411–13. 
 22. Shane Kotlarsky, What’s All the Noise About: Did the New York Yankees 
Violate Fans’ First Amendment Rights by Banning Vuvulezas in Yankee Stadium?, 20 
JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 35, 36 (2013). 
 23. Jeremy Olshan, Yanks ban vuvuzela pests’ instrument of torture, N.Y. POST 
(June 17, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/bronx/ 
bronx_blowhards_v3yRWOSPKLLHaIUNFaus1I. 
 24. Kotlarsky, supra note 22, 66–67. 
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sponsors in the area surrounding the stadium.25  These “Clean Zones” are 
intended to prevent ambush marketing—a practice of entities who are not 
sponsors of a major sporting event using proximity and subtle references 
to imply a relationship and boost sales.26 In practice, “Clean Zones” serve 
as a government enforcement of speech protections to guarantee the 
sanctity of private sponsorship agreements between the NFL and its 
sponsors.27  Legal author Ari Sliffman argues that even though these 
restrictions target commercial speech, they still do not amount to a clear 
constitutional violation.28  
Similarly, legal analysis by another legal scholar questioned the 
enforceability of sign policies implemented during ESPN’s popular 
College Football GameDay program.29  While the show rarely broadcasts 
from inside of stadiums, each broadcast draws hundreds of fans who 
typically stand behind the set waving flags, banners, and signs.30  ESPN 
policies prohibit signs which depict political, religious, or profane 
language and are normally enforced, at least in part, by local campus 
police officers.31 According to Ternes, the restriction of speech on the 
public fora of college campuses, even by a private entity like ESPN, 
represents an illegal restriction of individual speech based on its 
content.32  Again, while lawsuits aimed at the ESPN GameDay policy 
have only been mentioned, there is substantial evidence to suggest that 
such a case would likely succeed.33   
These incidents raise two considerations in discussing potential First 
Amendment litigation in our hypothetical case: first, the applicability of 
  
 25. Ari J. Sliffman, Unconstitutional Hosting of the Super Bowl: Anti-Ambush 
Marketing Clean Zones’ Violation of the First Amendment, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
257, 258–59 (2011). 
 26. Id. at 260. 
 27. Id. at 258–59. 
 28. Id. at 283–84. 
 29. Neal Ternes, Everywhere a Sign: ESPN College GameDay and the First 
Amendment, 17 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 159, 159 (2017). 
 30. Sean Rossman, Does ESPN’s GameDay control free speech?, TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT (Oct. 23, 2014, 2:18 PM), 
http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/local/2014/10/22/espns-gameday-control-free-
speech/17721195/. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Ternes, supra note 29, at 160. 
 33. Id. at 163–65. 
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the First Amendment to the forum in which the speech and restriction 
take place, and second, whether the restriction is content-specific or 
merely a restriction based on time, place, and manner. 
In order for the First Amendment to apply to any potential claim by 
our hypothetical non-citizen plaintiff, the restricting party must first be 
shown to be a state actor.34  This would include any sporting venue that is 
publicly owned,35 any venue with significant government ties,36 and 
speech restrictions enforced by public police forces.37 Given that most 
modern stadiums in the United States are publicly financed,38 and many 
major sporting events take place either directly on public property (such 
as those between public universities), in conjunction with significant 
state support, and with the help of public law enforcement, it is 
  
 34. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (stating “Congress shall make no law . . . .”). 
This power is extended to include action by state governments via the 14th Amendment. 
See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654 (1925); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 494 (1965). 
 35. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and 
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1765 (1987). Though the analysis 
of when a stadium is publicly owned is a separate analysis and one of degrees when 
considering the structure of modern stadium financing arrangements, this discussion is 
largely beyond the scope of this paper. For further discussion on the issue of stadium 
financing and the Gordian knot of public and private financing, see generally Christopher 
M. McLeod & John T. Holden, Ecological Economics and Sport Stadium Public 
Financing, 41 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 581 (2017).   
 36. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1961); 
Kaitlin Shire, You Can’t Sit with Us: Limiting Free Speech in Sports Arenas and How the 
Tampa Bay Lightning Took Home Ice Advantage Too Far, 24 JEFFREY S. MOORAD 
SPORTS L.J. 81, 82 (2017). 
 37. See Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964).  There remains something 
of an open question regarding the use of private police or security and whether by 
performing the functions of a state-actor often through public-private police partnerships 
constitutional rights may be triggered. See generally M. Rhead Enion, Constitutional 
Limits on Private Policing and the State’s Allocation of Force, 59 DUKE L.J. 519, 519 
(2009). 
 38. See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Fans and the First 
Amendment: Cheering and Jeering in College Sports, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004); 
David Uberti, How American sports franchises are selling their cities short, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2014, 7:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/sep/22/-
sp-how-american-sports-franchises-sell-cities-short; Richard Florida, The Never-Ending 
Stadium Boondoggle, CITYLAB (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/09/the-never-ending-stadium-boondoggle/403666/. 
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reasonable to conclude that the number of sporting venues satisfying the 
criteria for a public forum is meaningful.39 
Forum analyses distinguish between three types of publicly held 
spaces with differing degrees of protection afforded for First Amendment 
claims.40  Public fora are spaces owned and operated by the government 
for the purpose of peaceable assembly and speech with restrictions 
limited to strict scrutiny,41 such as public parks or most sidewalks.42  
Limited public fora are publicly operated spaces set aside for 
expressive activities but where the government may put reasonable 
limitations on who may use the forum.43  Examples of a limited public 
fora would include public school buildings, municipal auditoriums, and 
sports stadiums,44 as they are typically constructed with a specific 
intended function, but can be made available to the public for a number 
of different activities.45  While it is acceptable to limit speech which may 
disrupt the functioning of events in these spaces (such as dress codes in 
public schools or rules prohibiting signs that obstruct views of other fans 
at a sporting event), these limits are almost always content neutral and 
relative to the intended function of the space during an event.46 
  
 39. Howard M. Wasserman, Fans, Free Expression, and the Wide World of 
Sports, 67 U. PITTSBURGH L. REV. 525, 550 (2006). 
 40. See Post, supra note 35, at 1750–51. 
 41. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); see 
also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1972). 
 42. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990). 
 43. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent 454 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1981); Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995). For an extensive 
overview of the limited public forum doctrine see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny 
Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions 
on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 
(1996). 
 44. See Calvert supra note 38, at 4; Wasserman supra note 39, at 550–51.  See 
generally Ludtke v. Kuhn 461 F. Supp. 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 45. See Kotlarsky supra note 22, at 56–57. For example, while open to the public, 
sports stadiums still require a ticket for access (and continued access for duration of the 
event can be conditioned to adherence of content-neutral behavioral restrictions), and 
thus, unlike a public park or sidewalk, which any one can access without fee, stadiums 
maintain some limitations on access. See, e.g., id. 
 46. See, id. at 52. 
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Finally, non-public fora, which are publicly owned spaces like 
military bases or airports that traditionally are not set aside for expressive 
activities.47  These spaces have the most restrictions on free speech in 
order to protect the safety of the public and to facilitate the utility of the 
public space for its intended function.48  
Content-based restrictions to free speech in a designated public forum 
are subject to strict scrutiny,49 meaning there must be a compelling 
government interest in a speech restriction that is content-specific.50  
Outside of speech content—normally seen as beyond the scope of First 
Amendment protection, such as fighting words51 or incitement52—there is 
little that stadium managers can do to implement content-based speech 
restrictions in their public facilities.53  Given that Safai’s banner read, 
“Let Iranian women enter their stadiums” 54 – a political message which 
does not fall into a category of speech outside of constitutional 
protection—any content-based restriction of her speech would likely 
violate the First Amendment.   
Limited public fora can, however, regulate speech based on time, 
place, and manner, so long as the restrictions remain content-neutral.55  
This would be most applicable to Safai’s case if a stadium were to have 
  
 47. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976). 
 48. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 854–56. 
 49. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 741 n.11 (2010). 
Strict scrutiny can be best understood as the Court determining through a normative 
judgement whether a government interest is important enough to justify a speech 
restriction and an empirical judgement as to whether the means of restriction are 
narrowly tailored to achieve those means. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, 
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1997).   
 50. For a discussion on the applicability of the First Amendment, see generally 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (stating “‘the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.’”) (Quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 
60, 65 (1983)); see generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 
432 U.S. 43 (1977); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).  
 51. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 52. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 53. If You Build It, They Will Speak, supra note 7, at 19. 
 54. See sources cited supra note 1. 
 55. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792–93 (1989). 
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instituted a general prohibition on signs and banners during games—a 
policy that has previously been implemented by several sports teams.56  
The rationale behind such policies—that signs and similar 
communicative devices both pose safety hazards and create viewpoint 
obstructions—has been upheld in a court ruling upholding a ban on flag 
sticks at the University of Mississippi.57  However, such policies are not 
infallible and could face legal challenges for being overbroad for banning 
all sizes and materials of signs from sporting venues.58 
In our hypothetical case involving non-citizen speech, a stadium 
policy prohibiting signs and banners could be challenged for being 
overly broad, but it is unlikely that such a challenge would be successful 
given that time, place, and manner restrictions only face an intermediate 
scrutiny standard in limited public fora.59  Such a ban would not prevent 
a non-citizen plaintiff from wearing, as Safai did, a shirt bearing a similar 
political message or for verbally expressing her political position in the 
stands.60  
Attempts to remove Safai or her banner from a U.S. stadium, like the 
ones she encountered at the 2016 Rio Olympics, would likely be found 
unconstitutional.  Barring a stadium policy that prohibits signs out of a 
general safety or viewpoint obstruction concern, Safai would have 
grounds for a First Amendment claim if attempts were made to curb her 
speech in a U.S. venue.  While the International Olympic Committee 
  
 56. See e.g., Paul Kimbrough, UVA Dropped Ball on Sign Ban, MISS. ST. U. 
WIRE REFLECTOR, Sep. 12, 2008; see also Dodgers to Review Stadium Flag Ban, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 20, 2007 (the review by the Dodgers came after members of the 
Canadian expatriate group were ejected from a game for waiving a Canadian flag in 
support of Canadian-born Dodger’s player Russel Martin). 
 57. Barrett v. Khayat, No. CIV.A. 397CV211BA, 1999 WL 33537194, at *3, *7 
(N.D. Miss. Nov. 12, 1999). The Mississippi ban was highly contentious as it was viewed 
as an effort by University Chancellor Robert Khayat to eliminate the waving of the 
confederate flag at football games. Id. at *2–*4. See also Brian Cabell, Flag bans tugs on 
Ole Miss traditions, CNN (Oct. 25, 1997, 10:44 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9710/25/ole.miss/. 
 58. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 1266. 
 59. Time, place, and manner restrictions must be “‘narrowly tailored’ in order to 
survive First Amendment challenge,” but the court stops short of applying a strict 
scrutiny standard.  See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 n.6. 
 60. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 1267. 
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policy61 may prohibit political speech, IOC policy does not override 
Constitutional protections.62 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS FOR NON-U.S. CITIZENS 
While Darya Safai would likely be able to claim that speech 
restrictions placed on the display of her sign violated her First 
Amendment right to free speech if she were a citizen, there is still a 
question about the applicability of the First Amendment claims made by 
non-citizens.63  Many legal scholars have taken the positions that foreign 
nationals are “persons” and therefore share all constitutional protections 
not expressly reserved to citizens.64  From this perspective, the only 
rights not held by foreign nationals are the right to vote and the right to 
hold elective office.65  On the opposite end of the debate, there are a 
number of court rulings which argue that foreign nationals have limited, 
if any, constitutional rights.66  For those advocating such positions, the 
different treatment of citizens and non-citizens (often referred to in such 
contexts as “aliens”)67 is justified because if they were to be treated 
  
 61. IOC, supra note 3. 
 62. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding” U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. 
 63. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled To The Same Constitutional 
Rights As Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 368–69 (2003) [hereinafter Foreign 
Nationals]. 
 64. Id. at 368. 
 65. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 978 (2002) [hereinafter 
Enemy Aliens]. 
 66. Id. at 970; see also, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531–32 (1954); 
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 
581, 596–97, 603 (1889).    
 67. “By definition, aliens are outsiders to the national community. Even if they 
have lived in this country for many years, have had children here, and work and have 
deep community ties in the United States, noncitizens remain aliens, an institutionalized 
‘other,’ different and apart from ‘us.’ The classification of persons as aliens, as opposed 
to citizens, has significant legal, social, and political importance.” Kevin R. Johnson, 
“Aliens” and The U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of 
Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 264 (1996).    
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equally, the concept of citizenship itself would be meaningless.68  In this 
section, we focus on the history of legal precedent concerning the 
constitutional protections afforded to non-citizens in order to outline the 
inconsistent legal terrain facing potential international litigants in First 
Amendment proceedings.  
The Chinese Exclusion Act, adopted in 1882, was the first statute in 
U.S. history to specifically prohibit immigration based on nationality.69  
Wong Wing and three other Chinese men were determined to be 
unlawful Chinese immigrants and were sentenced to sixty days of hard 
labor at the Detroit House of Labor before being deported back to 
China.70 In Wong Wing v. United States, the court voided their 
imprisonment and ruled that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect non-citizens who are charged with crimes.71 This 
case is important because it established that non-citizens subject to 
criminal proceedings are protected by the same constitutional protections 
given to citizens.72  While previous rulings stemming from the Chinese 
Exclusion Act reinforced the power of Congress to exclude and expel 
aliens from the country,73 the decision put forth in Wong Wing balanced 
those decisions by also guaranteeing non-citizens in the country 
constitutional protections during immigration proceedings.74  
Similarly, the Court has acknowledged that the Equal Protection 
Clause is “universal in [its] application, to all persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, 
or of nationality.”75 This ruling was the result of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
where Wo, a Chinese laundry owner, challenged a San Francisco city 
ordinance that prohibited the operation of laundry facilities in wooden 
buildings.76  While not explicit in the statute, the ordinance targeted 
many Chinese laundry owners who tended to operate out of wooden 
  
 68. See Foreign Nationals, supra note 63, at 367.  
 69. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 597. 
 70. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 234 (1896). 
 71. Id. at 238. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732 (1893) 
(discussing The Chinese Exclusion Act and several different cases). 
 74. Wong Wing,163 U.S. at 238.  
 75. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
 76. Id. at 369. 
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buildings77.  When Wo, a non-citizen, was jailed for refusing to pay a 
fine stemming from the ordinance, he argued that his constitutional right 
to Equal Protection had been violated.78  The Court ruled that Wo was 
entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that 
the California-based ordinance that was prohibiting the operation of 
laundry businesses in wooden buildings was discriminatory despite the 
lack of any explicit language in the statute targeting Chinese 
businesses.79  
On the other hand, there are also cases where non-citizens have been 
denied full or partial constitutional rights by the courts. For example, in 
Porterfield v. Webb and Terrace v. Thompson the courts in both 
Washington and California affirmed that it was illegal for Japanese 
people to buy and own land in the United States—a decision predicated 
on ethnic grounds.80 Porterfield was a citizen of the United States and a 
resident of California who desired to lease his land to Mizuno, a 
Japanese citizen, for a term of five years.81 However, because of a treaty 
between the United States and Japan that did not grant Japanese citizens 
the privilege to acquire or lease land for agricultural purposes,82 the court 
announced that Mizuno was ineligible to enter a contract with 
Porterfield.83 Similarly, in Terrace v. Thompson the Court ruled that the 
Terraces, who were American citizens, had no right by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to lease their land to aliens who, according to the 
Constitution of Washington were prohibited to own lands unless they 
had, in good faith, declared the intention to become American citizens.84  
In Bridges v. California, the court recognized the rights of Harry 
Bridges, an Australian and outspoken socialist working as a 
longshoreman in California, to free speech protections under the 
  
 77. Id. at 373–74. 
 78. Id. at 365–66. 
 79. Id. at 374. 
 80. Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 US 
197, 223–24 (1923). Notably, the Supreme Court similarly upheld the internment of 
Japanese-American U.S. citizens during World War II. Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 222–24 (1944). 
 81. Porterfield, 263 U.S. at 231. 
 82. Id. at 232. 
 83. Id. at 233.  
 84. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 33 (repealed 1966); Terrace, 263 U.S. at 221. 
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Constitution after Bridges helped publish an opinion in the Los Angeles 
Times threatening a union strike, ostensibly to influence ongoing legal 
proceedings.85  Bridges’ status as a non-citizen was not addressed by the 
majority, but Justice Frankfurter, writing in dissent, noted that only the 
Due Process clause granted constitutional rights to resident aliens, but 
the limitations to which protections are granted to non-citizens in such 
cases are non-specific.86  Simply, Justice Frankfurter’s dissent raises the 
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment actually extends First 
Amendment protections to non-citizens or whether their civil liberties are 
more limited.87 
Following this case, the state of California attempted to have Bridges 
deported for his communist sympathies.88  However, the Supreme Court 
ruled in Bridges v. Wixon that Bridges’ sympathies or beliefs were not 
enough evidence to prove a direct tie to the Communist Party, and the 
previous rulings favoring deportation were thrown out.89  Writing in 
concurrence,  Justice Murphy acknowledged that “this Court has 
previously and expressly recognized that Harry Bridges, the alien, 
possesses the right to free speech,” and that “the very provisions of the 
Constitution negative the proposition that Congress, in the exercise of a 
‘plenary’ power, may override the rights of those who are numbered 
among the beneficiaries of the Bill of Rights.”90 
In cases of individuals with a legal status in the country, in Kwong 
Hai Chew v. Colding, the Court stated that rights that are “protected by 
the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” do not acknowledge “any distinction between 
  
 85. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 277–78 (1941). 
 86. Id. at 280–81. 
 87. Id.  It is worth noting that Justice Frankfurter’s dissent also mentions the 
limited scope of protections granted to corporations under the Due Process Clause, 
stating that such protections only exist for their property. Id.  In light of the court’s 
decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010), where 
the Court held that corporations do indeed possesses First Amendment rights, it is worth 
questioning whether the present Court would be willing to deny the “person-hood” of 
non-citizens under the Constitution in First Amendment cases while simultaneously 
granting this status to international corporations.   
 88. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 137–38 (1945). 
 89. Id. at 156–57. 
 90. Id. at 161–62 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
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citizens and resident aliens.”91  Kwong Hair Chew was a Chinese seaman 
who was admitted to permanent residency in the United States but was 
“temporarily excluded” under 8 CFR § 175.57(b) upon his arrival from a 
ship voyage that included calls at several foreign ports in Asia. 92  In this 
case, the Supreme Court held that a lawful permanent resident who 
departs and returns to the country as a seaman on an American ship 
retains procedural due process rights and shall not be deported without a 
hearing.93 
Contrary to Section 10 of the Act of March 3, 1891, which suggests 
unlawful aliens shall immediately be deported,94 there are examples of 
the courts stating that “once an alien enters the country, the legal 
circumstance changes [in that] the Due Process Clause applies to all 
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, [whose] . . . presence 
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”95 This ruling was 
specifically mentioned in Zadvydas v. Davis, after Kestutis Zadvydas, a 
resident alien, was ordered deported in 1994 because of his criminal 
record.96 In that case, the Court ruled that a statute authorizing “indefinite 
detention of [an alien] would raise serious constitutional” problems, 
stating that “aliens who have once passed through [the country’s] gates, 
even illegally, may be expelled only after conforming to traditional 
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”97 
More recently, the courts have relied on a ‘substantial connection’ 
standard for determining whether a non-citizen would be granted 
constitutional protections.98 In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez the 
court asserted that “aliens receive constitutional protection when they 
have come within the territory of the United States and developed 
  
 91. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (quoting Bridges, 
326 U.S. at 161 (Murphy, J., concurring)). 
 92. Id. at 592, 594. 
 93. Id. at 601–02. 
 94. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 10, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086. 
 95. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). 
 96. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684. 
 97. Id. at 682; id. at 695 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). 
 98. Michael Kagan, Do Immigrants Have Freedom of Speech? 6 CAL. L. REV. 
CIR. 84, 89 (2015). 
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substantial connections with this country.”99 The Court has also held that 
an alien extradited to the United States with no previous voluntary 
connection cannot claim Fourth Amendment rights to challenge the 
extraterritorial search of their property.100 This standard would almost 
certainly exclude a non-citizen who has illegally entered the country; 
however, it is unclear exactly how long of a stay would be necessary for 
a foreign national to show proof of substantial connection, and therefore 
acquire First Amendment protection, and whether constitutional 
protection would stay in place if the person remained in the country past 
the exact expiration date of a visa.101  
For example, in U.S. v. Tehrani, the Court ruled that the search and 
seizure of two non-citizens who had crossed the U.S. border from 
Canada and were arrested at the Burlington (Vermont) International 
Airport for the possession of counterfeit credit cards was illegal under 
the Fourth Amendment.102  The Court upheld the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the non-citizens since their “presence in the United States was 
voluntary, and they had gained admission, [although] surreptitiously, for 
a temporary visit as tourists.”103 In the opinion of the Court, “[s]uch 
connections are thus distinguishable from those in Verdugo–Urquidez 
and constitute the type of connections which would vest in aliens the 
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.”104  
Quite similarly, in Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security, the 
Court asserted that the plaintiff had “established a substantial voluntary 
connection with the United States through her . . . studies at a 
distinguished American university” on a student visa.105 Ibrahim was a 
Malaysian citizen and a Ph.D. student at Stanford from 2001 to 2005 but 
was not permitted to return back to the United States after traveling to a 
Stanford-sponsored conference in Malaysia to present her academic 
research.106 Allegedly, Ibrahim was prevented from flying back to the 
  
 99. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). 
 100. Id. at 261–62. 
 101. Kagan, supra note 98, at 86 n.16.  
 102. U.S. v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789, 794–95, 804 (D. Vt. 1993). 
 103. Id. at 804 n.1. 
 104. Id. at n.1. 
 105. Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 996 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 106. Id. at 986. 
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United States because her name was on a terrorist watchlist.107 “Ibrahim 
brought suit in federal district court seeking . . . injunctive relief under 
the First and Fifth Amendments, with the . . . aim of having her name 
removed from the government’s watchlist,” arguing that the U.S. 
government had mistakenly placed her name on the watchlist.108  Ibrahim 
was therefore granted the right to “assert claims against the federal 
defendants for prospective relief under the First and Fifth 
Amendments.”109  
The decisions in both Tehrani and Ibrahim are significant for 
potential future litigations concerning the substantial connection criteria. 
If there are instances of non-citizens on tourist and student visas passing 
the substantial connection test and hence receiving constitutional rights, 
it seems likely that an international tourist visiting for major sporting 
events like the Olympics or World Cup will also be afforded such a 
status.  
Nevertheless, based on the inconsistent legal terrain facing potential 
international litigants in First Amendment proceedings, it is fair to say 
that non-citizen speakers, irrespective of their legal or illegal status, may 
still face challenges to claim that their First Amendment rights were 
violated by speech restrictions in a U.S. sports venue.110  The Supreme 
Court has affirmed the right of the federal government to deny a person 
entry to the country because of their speech.111  There have also been a 
number of instances where foreign nationals have been deported for 
  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 999. 
 110. See  sources cited supra notes 63, 99, and 98, at 86 n.16. 
 111. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). A recent announcement 
from U.S. Homeland Security, the agency that operates the country’s borders, has 
suggested that visitors in the future may be required to turn over their electronics and be 
subjected to a review of the content on their social media profiles. See Olivia Blair, US 
Customs: Visitors May Have to Hand Phones and Social Media Passwords to TSA 
Agents, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 05, 2017, 10:16 AM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/us-customs-visitors-phones-
social-media-passwords-tsa-extreme-vetting-donald-trump-immigration-a7667516.html. 
The implication being that those with views, which run contrary to the Trump 
administrations ideals may be subjected to additional screening, or even denied entry. See 
generally id. 
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expressing their political beliefs,112 reasoning that Congress held the 
power to determine which individuals are allowed to be in the country.113 
For our hypothetical plaintiff, this raises the possibility that not only 
would her possible First Amendment claim against the sport venue fail, 
but also that her legal status in this country could be threatened if her 
political ideas were seen as threatening. 
Moreover, the history of legal decisions regarding the rights of 
immigrants have demonstrably been relative to the political climate, such 
as the recent Supreme Court decision in Trump v. Hawaii, upholding a 
travel ban which had originally been presented as a religious-based 
restriction for entry.114  The Court held that outside commentary of the 
President referring to the policy as a “Muslim ban” was not relevant to 
its application.115 This ruling would seemingly overturn Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, potentially signaling a more open atmosphere towards policies 
which are implicitly discriminatory in the name of protecting executive 
authority. Furthermore, given that the present political moment is fraught 
with images of asylum seekers being separated from their children and 
placed into camps along the Southern U.S. border,116 it would be naïve to 
conclude that the precedents set forth in cases like Tehrani and Ibrahim 
would be capable of completely safeguarding non-citizen visitors from 
being deprived of constitutional safeguards.   
  
 112. See e.g., U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams 194 U.S. 279, 281–82 (1904); 
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 524 (1954); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 473 (1999). 
 113. Kagan, supra note 98, at 88–89. 
 114. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
 115. Id. at 2401–02. 
 116. Mica Rosenberg, Exclusive: Nearly 1,800 families separated at U.S.- Mexico 
border in 17 months through February, REUTERS (June 08, 2012, 4:40 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-children-exclusive/exclusive-nearly-
1800-families-separated-at-us-mexico-border-in-17-months-through-february-
idUSKCN1J42UE. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Political speech receives the highest level of protection under the First 
Amendment117.  Darya Safai’s political commentary on her banner and 
shirt were not violating any reasonable, narrowly constructed stadium 
regulations on banners or flags, and her speech was not an abnormal 
disruption to the activities occurring within the sporting arena.  Further, 
her speech, had it occurred in the U.S., would have more than likely 
taken place in a publicly owned forum with rules enforcement conducted 
by public police.  Her status as a non-citizen would not, under the 
precedent set forth in cases such as Tehrani and Ibrahim, preclude her 
speech from constitutional protection.  For these reasons, we believe that 
political protests by non-citizens, such as the one Darya Safai engaged in 
during the 2016 Rio Olympic games, at U.S. sporting events (including 
at the 2026 World Cup) would be protected by the First Amendment.   
While the political climate has often led to shifts in the status of non-
citizen rights, the current case law provides a clear framework for 
recourse, should political speech during a U.S. sporting event be halted.  
This issue is particularly relevant given recent news that the U.S. is a part 
of a multinational coalition to host the 2026 World Cup,118 and the 
general proliferation of national and international sporting events in the 
country which attracts tourists every year.  Sport has long served as a 
locus for political discourse, and international sporting events in 
particular have the capacity to spotlight political discussion.  The First 
Amendment guarantees that even non-citizens who attend such events in 
the United States may use these stages to add their voice to the global 
political discourse. 
 
  
 117. See e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“All ideas having 
even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, 
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the 
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more 
important interests.”). 
 118. Tariq Panja & Andrew Das, World Cup 2026: United States, Canada and 
Mexico Win Bid to Be Host, N. Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/sports/world-cup/fifa-2026-vote-north-america-
morocco.html. 
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